Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Galen, Bonaventura and Michael Devitt

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]